This article is a summary of the United States’ involvement in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, with a focus on the policies and actions of each president from Truman to Bush Jr.
Truman essentially made it possible for Israel to exist by supporting the Balfour Declaration. After the 1948 war displaced some 750,000 Palestinians, Truman sought to enact a “reverse Balfour” (returning an unspecified number of Palestinians to their now occupied land) in order to stabilize Arab-Israeli relations in the short term. Negotiations came to a standstill following Arab outrage at the idea of only a partial repatriation. Truman shifted strategies, favoring a TVA-style public works project aimed at creating a sustainable resettlement zone and provide incentive for both sides to essentially drop the issue for the sake of economic development. By circumventing normal diplomacy altogether, Truman failed to address the growing nationalist ambitions among Palestinians. That doomed the plan.
Eisenhower tried a more even-handed approach that would incorporate land concessions, sponsor economic development, and ensure the refugees a voice in the process. Both sides instantly rejected the plan: Arab radicals refused to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist; Israelis viewed land concessions as unacceptable. The Suez crisis overshadowed further negotiations during this time.
JFK and Johnson proposed a plan that would allow 10,000 refugees to return per year, over a period of 2-3 years. The remaining refugees would be resettled in neighboring Arab nations. Kennedy ultimately believed this plan would be too costly and ultimately inoperable. Disagreements over the number of refugees who would be allowed to return ultimately stalled negotiations, setting the stage for increased soviet involvement and the rise of the PLO. As the soviet-armed (via Syria) PLO increased its activity, Israel bombed Damascus in retaliation, setting forces in motion that would culminate in the 6-Day War.
Nixon and Ford heavily supported a peace for land compromise, but the Israeli response was negative. During this time, the US refused to talk to the PLO, in order to deny it legitimacy.
Carter continued to view a peace for land deal as the great white hope of Arab-Israeli peace. Carter’s tactics were defined by subtlety and evenhandedness. At the Camp David Accords, Carter, Sadat, and Begin all signed a peace treaty that committed Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and begin to recognize the rights of Palestinians. The document avoided inflammatory language, simultaneously gave Israel a lot of discretion. It soon became clear that Israel would continue treating peace with Egypt as separate from the issue of Palestine.
Despite Reagan’s warmness to Israel upon entered office, peace efforts under his administration frustrated and were frustrated by both sides. The slaughter of Palestinian refugees by Israeli-sponsored Lebanese Christians created a lack of faith in Israel as a committed partner in negotiations. A common, pervasive, and violent revolt (Intifada) among Palestinians also undermined the PLO’s authority.
Many of Bush Sr.’s advisors felt no qualms at openly criticizing Israel. Instead of serving as a wake-up call, this tactic created a cooling in relations that sabotaged ongoing negotiations. For the first time, the Palestinian issue truly emerged as the center of the debate. That in itself was revolutionary.
Clinton initially had great success in negotiating a land for peace settlement, but the assassination of Rabin sparked a wave of violence that ended negotiations. Chains of missed opportunities on both sides and pervasive violence defined the era that followed, even more pointedly than it had in the past.
This article is a summary of the United States’ involvement in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, with a focus on the policies and actions of each president from Truman to Bush Jr.
ReplyDeleteTruman essentially made it possible for Israel to exist by supporting the Balfour Declaration. After the 1948 war displaced some 750,000 Palestinians, Truman sought to enact a “reverse Balfour” (returning an unspecified number of Palestinians to their now occupied land) in order to stabilize Arab-Israeli relations in the short term. Negotiations came to a standstill following Arab outrage at the idea of only a partial repatriation. Truman shifted strategies, favoring a TVA-style public works project aimed at creating a sustainable resettlement zone and provide incentive for both sides to essentially drop the issue for the sake of economic development. By circumventing normal diplomacy altogether, Truman failed to address the growing nationalist ambitions among Palestinians. That doomed the plan.
Eisenhower tried a more even-handed approach that would incorporate land concessions, sponsor economic development, and ensure the refugees a voice in the process. Both sides instantly rejected the plan: Arab radicals refused to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist; Israelis viewed land concessions as unacceptable. The Suez crisis overshadowed further negotiations during this time.
JFK and Johnson proposed a plan that would allow 10,000 refugees to return per year, over a period of 2-3 years. The remaining refugees would be resettled in neighboring Arab nations. Kennedy ultimately believed this plan would be too costly and ultimately inoperable. Disagreements over the number of refugees who would be allowed to return ultimately stalled negotiations, setting the stage for increased soviet involvement and the rise of the PLO. As the soviet-armed (via Syria) PLO increased its activity, Israel bombed Damascus in retaliation, setting forces in motion that would culminate in the 6-Day War.
Nixon and Ford heavily supported a peace for land compromise, but the Israeli response was negative. During this time, the US refused to talk to the PLO, in order to deny it legitimacy.
Carter continued to view a peace for land deal as the great white hope of Arab-Israeli peace. Carter’s tactics were defined by subtlety and evenhandedness. At the Camp David Accords, Carter, Sadat, and Begin all signed a peace treaty that committed Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and begin to recognize the rights of Palestinians. The document avoided inflammatory language, simultaneously gave Israel a lot of discretion. It soon became clear that Israel would continue treating peace with Egypt as separate from the issue of Palestine.
Despite Reagan’s warmness to Israel upon entered office, peace efforts under his administration frustrated and were frustrated by both sides. The slaughter of Palestinian refugees by Israeli-sponsored Lebanese Christians created a lack of faith in Israel as a committed partner in negotiations. A common, pervasive, and violent revolt (Intifada) among Palestinians also undermined the PLO’s authority.
Many of Bush Sr.’s advisors felt no qualms at openly criticizing Israel. Instead of serving as a wake-up call, this tactic created a cooling in relations that sabotaged ongoing negotiations. For the first time, the Palestinian issue truly emerged as the center of the debate. That in itself was revolutionary.
Clinton initially had great success in negotiating a land for peace settlement, but the assassination of Rabin sparked a wave of violence that ended negotiations. Chains of missed opportunities on both sides and pervasive violence defined the era that followed, even more pointedly than it had in the past.