This article traces patterns within the public statements issued by Al Qaeda leaders. This article also traces how there has been a consistent rift between Jihadi thinkers (predominantly established clerics) and militant organizations that carry out actions often labeled as Jihadist (Al Qaeda, in this case).
Bin Laden’s original statements nearly echo Huntington’s ideas of a clash between Muslim nations and Western powers as embodied by American military presence in Saudi Arabia and the area in general. He cast this conflict as a defensive action by a people acting in order to defend their own interests. Bombings in Kenya, et all were intended as a reprimand for US foreign policy.
The 9/11 attacks were a logical extension of that ideology. It was also an attempt to gain credibility in the West by asserting themselves as the premier militant Jihadist organization. The attack was also intended to draw the United States into the open, direct conflict that Jihadi thinkers had already been saying was already actually happening. The general Muslim uprising the leaders of Al Qaeda envisioned did not materialize, and thus the US military response was initially more focused than was envisioned.
In the following years, Bin Laden and other leaders repeatedly stated that they did not object to a long-term truce, if the United States would abandon the Middle East as a prime strategic interest.
Al Qaeda viewed the attack on Iraq as a clear statement of intention on the part of the US to establish an enduring, multi-generational presence in the region. This became a golden opportunity for Al Qaeda to have the battleground they originally sought to create via 9/11. The ideological leanings of the Al Qaeda leaders made them unwelcome among the social and religious establishment in Iraq, which was already fracturing.
Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology
ReplyDeleteThis article traces patterns within the public statements issued by Al Qaeda leaders. This article also traces how there has been a consistent rift between Jihadi thinkers (predominantly established clerics) and militant organizations that carry out actions often labeled as Jihadist (Al Qaeda, in this case).
Bin Laden’s original statements nearly echo Huntington’s ideas of a clash between Muslim nations and Western powers as embodied by American military presence in Saudi Arabia and the area in general. He cast this conflict as a defensive action by a people acting in order to defend their own interests. Bombings in Kenya, et all were intended as a reprimand for US foreign policy.
The 9/11 attacks were a logical extension of that ideology. It was also an attempt to gain credibility in the West by asserting themselves as the premier militant Jihadist organization. The attack was also intended to draw the United States into the open, direct conflict that Jihadi thinkers had already been saying was already actually happening. The general Muslim uprising the leaders of Al Qaeda envisioned did not materialize, and thus the US military response was initially more focused than was envisioned.
In the following years, Bin Laden and other leaders repeatedly stated that they did not object to a long-term truce, if the United States would abandon the Middle East as a prime strategic interest.
Al Qaeda viewed the attack on Iraq as a clear statement of intention on the part of the US to establish an enduring, multi-generational presence in the region. This became a golden opportunity for Al Qaeda to have the battleground they originally sought to create via 9/11. The ideological leanings of the Al Qaeda leaders made them unwelcome among the social and religious establishment in Iraq, which was already fracturing.